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THIRD-PARTY REMOVAL UNDER SECTION 1441(c)
INTRODUCTION
Section 1441(c)1 of Title 28 of the United States Code permits a
defendant to remove an entire case from state to federal court2 when
"a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be
removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise
non-removable claims or causes of action."'3 By allowing a defendant4
to remove a claim cognizable in federal court if it is "separate and
independent" from non-removable claims in the same suit, section
1441(c) prevents a plaintiff from destroying a defendant's right of
removal by the joinder of unrelated non-removable claims.3 Neither
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976).
2. Removal is the procedure whereby a defendant sued in state court may elect
to have the case heard in federal court. C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 38
(4th ed. 1983). Unavailable at English common law and not mentioned in the
Constitution, id. at 209; IA J. Moore & B. Ringle, Moore's Federal Practice
11 0.156[1], at 15, 0.157[1.-1], at 33, (2d ed. 1983), removal is a statutory right. IA
J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra, 0.15711.-I], at 34; C. Wright, supra, § 38, at 209.
Nonetheless, it is well settled that the power of Congress to provide for removal is
constitutional. City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 833 (1966); Tennessee
v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 265 (1880).
In general, actions are removable if they originally could have been brought in
federal court. C. Wright, supra, § 38, at 210; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976). An
important limitation upon this general rule is that cases in which jurisdiction would
be based solely on diversity are not usually removable if any of the defendants is a
resident of the state in which the action is brought. IA J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra,
0.157[5], at 123; C. Wright, supra, § 38, at 214; e.g., Martin v. Snyder, 148 U.S.
663, 663-64 (1893); Dunkin Donuts of Am. v. Family Enters., 381 F. Supp. 371, 372
(D. Md. 1974); Hudler v. Wilson, 376 F. Supp. 592, 592 (D. Colo. 1974); see 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1976). By contrast, if removal jurisdiction is premised upon a
federal question, the defendant may remove regardless of his citizenship. 1A J. Moore
& B. Ringle, supra, 0.160[1], at 217-19; C. Wright, supra, § 38, at 214; see 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1976).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which
would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more other-
vise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be
removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its
discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its original juris-
diction.
4. Under the general removal statutes currently in effect, it is well settled that a
plaintiff who has elected to bring his action in a state forum may not later remove the
case to federal court. C. Wright, supra note 2, § 40, at 227; see Shamrock Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ("any civil
action brought in a State court ... may be removed by the defendant or defendants
5. Lewin, The Federal Courts' Hospitable Back Door-Removal of "Separate
and Independent" Non-Federal Causes of Action, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 423, 426-27
(1953); see Continental Resources & Mineral Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 546 F.
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the statutory language nor the legislative history,0 however, indicates
whether Congress intended this right of removal to attach only to
claims asserted by a plaintiff against a defendant, or whether it also
intended this right to extend to claims brought by a defendant against
a third-party defendant, who is made a party to the suit by the
original defendant through impleader. 7
In the absence of any explicit congressional or Supreme Court
guidance on this issue, lower federal courts have disagreed over the
application of section 1441(c) to third-party claims. 8 A majority of
courts and commentators has concluded that third-party claims may
not be removed under the statute.9 Under one line of analysis, third-
Supp. 850, 852 (S.D.W. Va. 1982); Southland Corp. v. Estridge, 456 F. Supp. 1296,
1299 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Cohen, Problems in the Removal of a "Separate and Indepen-
dent Claim or Cause of Action," 46 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1961).
6. See H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A133-34 (1947), reprinted in
Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976).
7. See IA J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2, 0.167[10], at 507-15; C.
Wright, supra note 2, § 39, at 223; 14 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3724, at 643-46 (1976). Impleader is the procedure whereby
a defendant may bring into the suit, as a third-party defendant, a party who may be
liable to the defendant if the defendant is liable to the plaintiff. C. Wright, supra
note 2, § 76, at 509; e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (federal impleader statute); Ala. R.
Civ. P. 14(a) (state impleader statute); Mass. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (same); N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Law § 1007 (McKinney 1976) (same).
Although the statutory language and the legislative history are unclear as to
whether plaintiffs may remove counterclaims or defendants may remove cross-claims
under section 1441(c), see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. A133-34 (1947), reprinted in Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)
(1976), the general consensus of courts and commentators is that such claims fail to
provide a basis for removal. See United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Blackhawk Hold-
ing Corp., 341 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (cross-claim not removable);
Verschell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 257 F. Supp. 153, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (same);
Lee Foods Div., Consol. Grocers Corp. v. Bucy, 105 F. Supp. 402, 403-05 (W.D.
Mo. 1952) (counterclaim not removable); IA J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2,
0.167[8], at 499, 0.167[9], at 506; C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra, §
3724, at 643-45.
8. C. Wright, supra note 2, § 39, at 223; see 1A J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra
note 2, 0.167[10], at 507-15.
9. Jamison v. Schneider, 561 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (D. Kan. 1983); Morris v.
Marshall County Bd. of Educ., 560 F. Supp. 43, 45 (N.D.W. Va. 1983); Share v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Continental
Resources & Mineral Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 546 F. Supp. 850, 852 (S.D.W.
Va. 1982); Knight v. Hellenic Lines, 543 F. Supp. 915, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Chase
v. North Am. Sys., 523 F. Supp. 378, 382 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Garnas v. American
Farm Equip. Co., 502 F. Supp. 349, 351-52 (D.N.D. 1980); Croy v. Buckeye Int'l,
Inc., 483 F. Supp. 402, 407 (D. Md. 1979); Folts v. City of Richmond, 480 F. Supp.
621, 625 (E.D. Va. 1979); Avco Aurora Indus. Bank v. Cline, 459 F. Supp. 857, 858-
59 (D. Colo. 1978); In re Marriage of Thompson, 450 F. Supp. 197, 199 (W.D. Tex.
1978); Lowe's of Montgomery, Inc., v. Smith, 432 F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (M.D. Ala.
1977); White v. Hughes, 409 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (W.D. Tenn. 1975); Mid-State
Homes, Inc. v. Swain, 331 F. Supp. 337, 339 (W.D. Okla. 1971); Greater N.Y. Mut.
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party claims have been considered insufficiently "separate and inde-
pendent" from the main claim, as required by section 1441(c).10 Alter-
natively, based upon the Supreme Court's determination that removal
statutes should be strictly construed," third-party removal has been
denied on the grounds that either section 1441(c) pertains only to
claims joined by the original plaintiff,' 2 or that only the original
defendant, not the third-party defendant, may remove. 13
Ins. Co. v. Anchor Constr. Co., 326 F. Supp. 245, 249 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Tuyagda
Aluminum Prods. Corp. v. Hull Dobbs 65th Infantry Ford, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 774,
775 (D.P.R. 1970); Hyde v. Carder, 310 F. Supp. 1340, 1342 (W.D. Ky. 1970);
Fountain Park Coop., Inc. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n, 289 F. Supp.
150, 153-54 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Holloway v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 321,
323-24 (N.D. Il. 1967); Rager v. Crampes, 223 F. Supp. 346, 347 (W.D. Ky. 1963);
White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716, 722 (D.N.J. 1962); Burlingham,
Underwood, Barron, Wright & White v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 208 F. Supp. 544,
547-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Harper v. Sonnabend, 182 F. Supp. 594, 595 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); Shaver v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 171 F. Supp. 754, 763 (W.D. Ark.
1959); Texas Plumbing Co. v. Zurn Indus., 168 F. Supp. 144, 145 (N.D. Tex. 1958);
Manternach v. Jones County Farm 5erv. Co., 156 F. Supp. 574, 577 (N.D. Iowa
1957); Marshall v. Navco, 152 F. Supp. 50, 54 (S.D. Tex. 1957); Schoneweather v.
L. F. Richardson, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 692, 693 (W.D. Mo. 1954); Sequoyah Feed &
Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680, 682 (W.D. Ark. 1951); IA J. Moore & B.
Ringle, supra note 2, 0.167[10], at 514-15; 14 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
supra note 7, § 3724, at 645-46; Moore & VanDercreek, Multi-Party, Multi-Claim
Removal Problems: The Separate and Independent Claim Under Section 1441(c), 46
Iowa L. Rev. 489, 509 (1961); see 51 Mich. L. Rev. 115, 117 (1952) (removal under §
1441(c) is limited to claims joined by the plaintiff); 37 St. John's L. Rev. 373, 379
(1963) (trend in courts is to deny third-party removal).
10. E.g., Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. v. Russian River County Sanitation Dist.,
538 F. Supp. 488, 494 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Luebbe v. Presbyterian Hosp., 526 F. Supp.
1162, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Chase v. North Am. Sys., 523 F. Supp. 378, 383 (W.D.
Pa. 1981); In re Marriage of Thompson, 450 F. Supp. 197, 199 (W.D. Tex. 1978);
Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anchor Constr. Co., 326 F. Supp. 245, 249 (E.D. Pa.
1971); Coleman v. A & D Mach. Co., 298 F. Supp. 234, 237 (E.D. Cal. 1969);
Holloway v. Gamble-Skogmo Inc., 274 F. Supp. 321, 322 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Rager v.
Crampas, 223 F. Supp. 346, 347 (W.D. Ky. 1963); Schoneweather v. L. F. Richard-
son, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 692, 694 (W.D. Mo. 1954); see Jamison v. Schneider, 561 F.
Supp. 1087, 1090-91 (D. Kan. 1983).
11. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941); see
infra pt. I(A).
12. E.g., Folts v. City of Richmond, 480 F. Supp. 621, 625 (E.D. Va. 1979);
Lowe's of Montgomery, Inc. v. Smith, 432 F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (M.D. Ala. 1977);
White v. Hughes, 409 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (W.D. Tenn. 1975) (dictum); Greater
N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anchor Constr. Co., 326 F. Supp. 245, 248-49 (E.D. Pa.
1971); Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680, 682 (W.D. Ark.
1951).
13. E.g., Morris v. Marshall County Bd. of Educ., 560 F. Supp. 43, 45 (N.D.W.
Va. 1983); Share v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Continental Resources & Mineral Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 546 F. Supp. 850,
852 (S.D.W. Va. 1982); Knight v. Hellenic Lines, 543 F. Supp. 915, 917-18
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); Chase v. North Am. Sys., 523 F. Supp. 378, 382 (W.D. Pa. 1981);
White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716, 719-20 (D.N.J. 1962).
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Led principally by the Fifth Circuit,' 4 a minority of courts has
permitted third-party removal, usually on the basis of the principle of
uniform application of removal statutes.'- Their position is that if
third-party removal is prohibited, the right of removal will be depen-
dent on the different state impleader statutes. For example, a third
party impleaded under a liberal state impleader statute would be
unable to remove. If the same third party could not be impleaded due
to a strict state statute, however, the defendant presumably would sue
the third party in a new action and the third party generally would
have a right of removal.' 6 These courts therefore reason that third-
party removal under section 1441(c) must be allowed in order to
prevent such removal from being dependent upon arbitrary, and
largely fortuitous, differences between state impleader procedures.
17
In addition, the American Law Institute has recommended that third-
14. Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 135-36 (5th
Cir. 1980); see Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 494 F. Supp. 344, 350 (E.D. La.
1980), aff'd, 652 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); see
also Central of Ga. Ry. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 426 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1970)
(third-party claim removable after severed from main claim by state court).
15. E.g., Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 135-36
(5th Cir. 1980); Bond v. Doig, 433 F. Supp. 243, 247 (D.N.J. 1977); Myers v. Cain,
287 F. Supp. 352, 354 (D. Mont. 1968); Wayrynen Funeral Home, Inc. v. J. G. Link
& Co., 279 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mont. 1968); Industrial Lithographic Co. v.
Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954); see Gamble v. Central of Ga.
Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 326, 330 (M.D. Ala.), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 781
(5th Cir. 1973).
Other courts have simply found the third-party claim to be sufficiently "separate
and independent" to justify removal under Section 1441(c). Columbia Casualty Co.
v. Statewide Hi-Way Safety, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 182, 184 (D.N.J. 1982); Marsh Inv.
Corp. v. Langford, 494 F. Supp. 344, 350 (E.D. La. 1980), aff'd, 652 F.2d 583 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Peturis v. Fendley, 496 F. Supp. 203,
205 (S.D. Ala. 1980); Southland Corp. v. Estridge, 456 F. Supp. 1296, 1301 (C.D.
Cal. 1978) (dictum); Rafferty v. Frock, 135 F. Supp. 292, 293 (D. Md. 1955);
President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Monogram Assoc., 81 F. Supp. 739, 740
(E.D.N.Y. 1949).
16. See Gamble v. Central of Ga. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 326-27 (M.D. Ala.)
(quoting Industrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J.
1954)), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Wayrynen Funeral
Home, Inc. v. J. G. Link & Co., 279 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mont. 1968) (same);
Industrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954).
17. See Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 135 (5th
Cir. 1980) (quoting Industrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284,
286 (D.N.J. 1954)); Bond v. Doig, 433 F. Supp. 243, 247 (D.N.J. 1977); Gamble v.
Central of Ga. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 326 (M.D. Ala.) (quoting Industrial Litho-
graphic Co. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954)), rev'd on other
grounds, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Wayrynen Funeral Home, Inc. v. J. G. Link
& Co., 279 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mont. 1968) (same); Industrial Lithographic Co.
v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954).
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party claims in diversity cases should generally be removable in order
to avoid potential local prejudice."'
Even when the minority view is accepted and removal of third-
party claims is permitted, the federal courts do not adjudicate the
entire suit.' Rather, the courts that permit third-party removal re-
mand the principal claim to state court in virtually every case of this
nature, 20 thereby preserving the plaintiffs choice of forum and main-
taining a logical consistency with the concept of the third-party claim
as "separate and independent" from the principal claim. 21 Remand of
the main claim is appropriate under section 1441(c), which provides
18. American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State
and Federal Courts § 1304(b), at 16-17, 144, 146 (1969) (proposed statute and
commentary). As adopted by the American Law Institute (ALI), however, the
provision would not allow third-party removal if the defendant and the third party
are both insured by the same liability insurer, or if they have a relationship of
insurer-insured or of employer-employee. Id. § 1304(b), at 16-17, 146 (proposed
statute and commentary). Furthermore, the ALI would not permit third-party re-
moval on the basis of a federal question. Id. at 197 (commentary to § 1312(a)); see id.
§ 1312(a), at 25-26 (proposed statute).
19. See Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 134 (5th
Cir. 1980); Peturis v. Fendley, 496 F. Supp. 203, 205 (S.D. Ala. 1980); Wayrynen
Funeral Home, Inc. v. J. G. Link & Co., 279 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mont. 1968);
McMahon v. City of Troy, 122 F. Supp. 555, 557 (N.D.N.Y. 1954); Industrial
Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954).
20. Coleman v. A & D Mach. Co., 298 F. Supp. 234, 236 (E.D. Cal. 1969); e.g.
Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 134 (5th Cir. 1980);
Peturis v. Fendley, 496 F. Supp. 203, 205 (S.D. Ala. 1980); Wayrynen Funeral
Home, Inc. v. J. G. Link & Co., 279 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mont. 1968); McMahon
v. City of Troy, 122 F. Supp. 555, 557 (N.D.N.Y. 1954); Industrial Lithographic Co.
v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954). But see Gamble v. Central of
Ga. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 331 (M.D. Ala.) (court will hear main and third-party
claims), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Bond v. Doig, 433 F.
Supp. 243, 249 (D.N.J. 1977) (court to rule on remand at later date). When the basis
for removal under Section 1441(c) is a claim asserted against the original defendant,
however, courts have shown a greater willingness to hear other claims in the suit
lacking an independent basis of federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., U.S. Indus. v. Gregg,
348 F. Supp. 1004, 1023 (D. Del. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 540 F.2d 142 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Alexander v. Lash, 311 F. Supp. 524,
525 (D. Hawaii 1970); Herrmann v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1094, 1100
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Darnell v. Starks, 258 F. Supp. 31, 31-32 (D. Or. 1966); Knight v.
First Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 256 F. Supp. 32, 34 (W.D. Okla. 1966); Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913, 921-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Other
federal courts have exercised their discretion to remand the non-federal claims in
such cases. See, e.g., Till v. Unifirst Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 653 F.2d 152, 161-62
(5th Cir. 1981); Ondis v. Barrows, 538 F.2d 904, 908 (1st Cir. 1976); Brough v.
United Steelworkers, 437 F.2d 748, 750 (1st Cir. 1971); Pisciotta v. Ferrando, 428 F.
Supp. 685, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
21. Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 136 (5th
Cir. 1980); Peturis v. Fendley, 496 F. Supp. 203, 205 (S.D. Ala. 1980); Wayrynen
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that after a claim is removed "the district court may determine all
issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not other-
wise within its original jurisdiction."2 2
This Note examines whether removal of third-party claims is justi-
fied under section 1441(c) and argues that third-party defendants
should be allowed to remove under this provision only if the third-
party claim is indeed "separate and independent" from the principal
claim .23 This Note further contends that impleaded claims by their
nature are not truly "separate and independent," and thus may not be
removed under section 1441(c) .24 The various interests of each of the
parties and the policy ramifications of those interests with respect to
third-party removal are also addressed.25 The Note concludes that
additional claims26 asserted against an impleaded third-party defend-
ant may be sufficiently "separate and independent" from the principal
claim to provide a proper basis for removal under section 1441(c) .27
I. THIRD-PARTY REMOVAL-CONFLICTING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
OF SECTION 1441(c)
A. The Shamrock Analyses
The Supreme Court set forth the pivotal removal analyses in Sham-
rock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets.28 Curiously, the Shamrock analyses
have been applied both to permit and to deny third-party removal.
1. Strict Construction of Removal Statutes-The Majority View
The Supreme Court in Shamrock articulated the principle of strict
construction of removal statutes. In Shamrock, which involved a
predecessor of Section 1441,29 the plaintiff contended that he should
be considered a "defendant" in a permissive counterclaim for purposes
Funeral Home, Inc. v. J. G. Link & Co., 279'F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mont. 1968);
Industrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976). See supra note 3.
23. See infra pt. I.
24. See infra pt. II.
25. See infra pt. III.
26. Under various state joinder provisions patterned after Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a),
a defendant may assert any additional claims he has against an impleaded third-
party defendant. See, e.g., Ala. R. Civ. P. 18(a); Colo. R. Civ. P. 18(a); Mont. R.
Civ. P. 18(a); Vt. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
27. See infra pt. IV.
28. 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
29. Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1094-95, repealed by Act
of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992, 996 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1976)). Only defendants could remove under this earlier statute. The second sen-
tence of the statute provided as follows:
[Vol. 52
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of removal. 30 The Court disagreed, holding that the right of removal
under the statute was confined to the original defendant. 31 In reach-
ing its decision, the Court stated:
[T]he policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the juris-
diction of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of
such [removal] legislation .... Due regard for the rightful inde-
pendence of state governments ... requires that [the federal
courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise
limits which the statute has defined. 32
Based upon the Shamrock principle of strict construction of removal
statutes, a majority of courts has denied third-party removal under
section 1441(c) 33 on two grounds. Under one line of analysis, courts
have construed the phrase "joined with" in section 1441(c) to mean
that removal under the section can be achieved only on the basis of
claims joined by the plaintiff, not those joined by the defendant,
thereby precluding removal of third-party claims. 34 Other courts have
analyzed section 1441(c) in conjunction with section 1441(a), which
sets forth the general rule that only defendants can remove. 35 Follow-
Any other suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of which the district
courts of the United States are given jurisdiction by this title, and which are
[sic] now pending or which may hereafter be brought, in any State court,
may be removed into the district court of the United States for the proper
district by the defendant or defendants therein, being nonresidents of that
State.
Id. at 1094 (emphasis added).
30. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104 (1941).
31. Id. at 108.
32. Id. at 108-09 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
33. See Morris v. Marshall County Bd. of Educ., 560 F. Supp. 43, 45 (N.D.W.
Va. 1983); Share v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Continental Resources & Mineral Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 546 F. Supp. 850,
852 (S.D.W. Va. 1982); Knight v. Hellenic Lines, 543 F. Supp. 915, 917-18
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); Chase v. North Am. Sys., 523 F. Supp. 378, 382 (W.D. Pa. 1981);
Folts v. City of Richmond, 480 F. Supp. 621, 625 (E.D. Va. 1979); Lowe's of
Montgomery, Inc. v. Smith, 432 F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (M.D. Ala. 1977); Greater
N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anchor Constr. Co., 326 F. Supp. 245, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716, 719-20 (D.N.J. 1962); Sequoyah
Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680, 682 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
34. Folts v. City of Richmond, 480 F. Supp. 621, 625 (E.D. Va. 1979); Lowe's of
Montgomery, Inc. v. Smith, 432 F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (M.D. Ala. 1977); Greater
N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anchor Constr. Co., 326 F. Supp. 245, 248-49 (E.D. Pa.
1971); Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680, 682 (W.D. Ark.
1951).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976). Section 1441(a) provides as follows:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defend-
ants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.
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ing the Court in Shamrock, these courts have interpreted the term
"defendant" from section 1441(a) to refer only to the original defend-
ant, and thus have concluded that section 1441(c) does not provide for
removal by third-party defendants. 36
Both analyses, however, are subject to criticism. Section 1441(c)
does not explicitly refer to claims joined exclusively by the plaintiff,
and it therefore may be argued that removal by third-party defend-
ants should not be denied merely because the plaintiff did not join the
claim.3 7 Denying third-party removal on the basis of a restrictive
interpretation of "joined with" thus may be inconsistent with the
express language of the statute. 38 Moreover, in other procedural con-
texts the term "join" simply refers to the linking of claims or parties in
one suit, and does not limit the opportunity for joinder to the plain-
tiff.39 For example, Rule 18(a), which is concerned with the joinder of
claims, specifically provides that any party may join claims against an
opposing party. 40 The phrase "joined with" in section 1441(c) can,
therefore, be interpreted to refer to the joinder of claims by any party,
not just the plaintiff.
In addition, the term "defendant" is absent from section 1441(c).
Courts therefore have argued that removal by third-party defendants
should not be denied on the ground that section 1441(c) applies only to
the original defendant. 41 Moreover, even if section 1441(c) is read in
36. Share v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Continental Resources & Mineral Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 546 F. Supp. 850,
852 (S.D.W. Va. 1982); Knight v. Hellenic Lines, 543 F. Supp. 915, 917-18
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); Chase v. North Am. Sys., 523 F. Supp. 378, 382 (W.D. Pa. 1981);
White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716, 719-20 (D.N.J. 1962); see Morris v.
Marshall County Bd. of Educ., 560 F. Supp. 43, 45 (N.D.W. Va. 1983).
37. Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 136 (5th
Cir. 1980); see Bond v. Doig, 433 F. Supp. 243, 247-48 (D.N.J. 1977); Gamble v.
Central of Ga. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 330 (M.D. Ala.), rev'd on other grounds, 486
F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973).
38. See Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 136 (5th
Cir. 1980); Bond v. Doig, 433 F. Supp. 243, 247-48 (D.N.J. 1977); Gamble v.
Central of Ga. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 330 (M.D. Ala.), rev'd on other grounds, 486
F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973).
39. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 (Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 (Permissive Joinder of Parties).
40. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). The Rule reads as follows:
(a) Joinder of Claims. A party asserting a claim to relief as an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as
independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or
maritime, as he has against an opposing party.
Id.
41. Coleman v. A & D Mach. Co., 298 F. Supp. 234, 236 (E.D. Cal. 1969); see
Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. v. Russian River County Sanitation Dist., 538 F. Supp.
488, 492 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Gamble v. Central of Ga. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 330
(M.D. Ala.), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973).
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conjunction with section 1441(a), a third-party defendant is as much a
"defendant" as the original defendant, because the third party may be
indirectly liable for the plaintiff's entire judgment.42
Regardless of the specific analysis under the majority view, reliance
upon Shamrock may be misplaced. Courts denying removal by third
parties have reasoned that the issue is essentially the same as that
presented in Shamrock43-whether a plaintiff may remove on the
theory that he is a "defendant" on a permissive counterclaim. 44 Sham-
rock, however, can be distinguished from cases of third-party re-
moval. The Court in Shamrock stated that the plaintiff should abide
by his choice of a state forum. 45 A third-party defendant, on the other
hand, does not choose to litigate in state court, but rather is brought
involuntarily into the forum by the defendant. 46 Like an original
defendant, a third-party defendant therefore may need the protection
of the removal statutes, while the plaintiff does not.47 A third-party
defendant thus should have a right of removal under section 1441(c) if
the statutory requirement of a "separate and independent" claim is
met.
2. Uniform Application of Removal Statutes-The Minority View
Shamrock has also been read as support for the view permitting
removal of third-party claims.4 The Shamrock Court stated:
The removal statute, which is nationwide in its operation, was
intended to be uniform in its application, unaffected by local law
.... Hence the [removal statute] must be construed as setting up
its own criteria, irrespective of local law, for determining in what
instances suits are to be removed from the state to the federal
courts.4 9
42. Coleman v. A & D Mach. Co., 298 F. Supp. 234, 236-37 (E.D. Cal. 1969);
see Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. v. Russian River County Sanitation Dist., 538 F.
Supp. 488, 492 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
43. Share v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Knight v. Hellenic Lines, 543 F. Supp. 915, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); see Sequoyah Feed
& Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680, 681-82 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
44. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 103-04 (1941).
45. See id. at 106-07 & n.2.
46. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
47. Gamble v. Central of Ga. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 328 (M.D. Ala.), rev'd on
other grounds, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); see Coleman v. A & D Mach. Co., 298
F. Supp. 234, 236 & n.3 (E.D. Cal. 1969).
48. Wayrynen Funeral Home, Inc., v. J. G. Link & Co., 279 F. Supp. 803, 805-
06 (D. Mont. 1968); Industrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284,
286 (D.N.J. 1954); see Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d
133, 135-36 (5th Cir. 1980); Bond v. Doig, 433 F. Supp. 243, 247 (D.N.J. 1977);
Gamble v. Central of Ga. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 326-27, 331 (M.D. Ala.), rev'd on
other grounds, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Myers v. Cain, 287 F. Supp. 352, 354
(D. Mont. 1968).
49. 313 U.S. 100, 104 (1941).
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Thus, section 1441(c) must be construed so that its application cannot
be affected by state law concerning impleader of third-party claims. 50
If third-party removal is not permitted under section 1441(c), removal
will turn on the applicable state impleader statute. 5 For example, if a
strict state impleader statute prohibited impleader of a particular
claim by the defendant/third-party plaintiff against a potential third-
party defendant, the defendant/third-party plaintiff would presum-
ably sue the potential third-party defendant in a new action.5 2 Assum-
ing the general criteria for removal were satisfied, the potential
third-party defendant would unquestionably have a right as defend-
ant to remove the case.53 If a liberal state impleader statute allowed
the defendant to implead this same claim against the potential third-
party defendant, however, the ability of the third-party defendant to
remove would rest on the interpretation of section 1441(c) . 4 To deny
third-party removal under section 1441(c) on the basis of a particular
state's impleader procedure would be contrary to the policy of uni-
form application of removal statutes. 55
The foundation upon which this argument rests is the unfairness of
allowing removal to turn on local state practice regarding third-party
procedures. 56 Such variance in state practice, however, existed in the
situation presented in Shamrock.57 Indeed, the result in Shamrock
50. Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 135-36 (5th
Cir. 1980); Bond v. Doig, 433 F. Supp. 243, 247 (D.N.J. 1977); Wayrynen Funeral
Home, Inc. v. J. C. Link & Co., 279 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mont. 1968); Industrial
Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954); see Gamble
v. Central of Ga. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 326-27, 331 (M.D. Ala.) (quoting Industrial
Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954)), rev'd on
other grounds, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Myers v. Cain, 287 F. Supp. 352, 354
(D. Mont. 1968).
51. See supra note 50.
52. See Gamble v. Central of Ga. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 326-27 (M.D. Ala.)
(quoting Industrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J.
1954)), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Wayrynen Funeral
Home, Inc. v. J. G. Link & Co., 279 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mont. 1968) (same);
Industrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954).
53. See supra note 52.
54. See supra note 52.
55. See Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 135-36
(5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Industrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp.
284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954); Bond v. Doig, 433 F. Supp. 243, 247 (D.N.J. 1977); Gamble
v. Central of Ga. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 326-27 (M.D. Ala.) (quoting Industrial
Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954)), rev'd on
other grounds, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Wayrynen Funeral Home, Inc. v. J. G.
Link & Co., 279 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mont. 1968) (same); Industrial Lithographic
Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954).
56. 1A J. Moore& B. Ringle, supra note 2, 0.167[10], at 511-13. See supra note
48.
57. Knight v. Hellenic Lines, 543 F. Supp. 915, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); IA J.
Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2, 0.167[10] n.24, at 512; see Central of Ga. Ry. v.
Riegel Textile Corp., 426 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1970).
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made the right of removal depend on local state practice concerning
counterclaims. 5 The principle of uniform application of removal stat-
utes therefore may fail to provide an adequate basis for third-party
removal. Rather, the ability of a third-party defendant to remove
must depend upon whether the statutory requirement that the claim
be "separate and independent" is met.
B. The Meaning of "'Separate and Independent"
1. Judicial Interpretation of the "Separate and Independent"
Requirement
Section 1441(c) requires that a claim be "separate and independent"
before a defendant can remove the claim to federal court.5 9 In Ameri-
58. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 426 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir.
1970); Knight v. Hellenic Lines, 543 F. Supp. 915, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); 1A J.
Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2, 0.167[10] n.24, at 512; see Shamrock Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941). In Shamrock, the Court held that a plaintiff
could not remove on the theory that he was a "defendant" on a permissive counter-
claim. 313 U.S. at 106-08. If the local state procedure did not permit the defendant
to assert the counterclaim, however, the defendant would have had to assert the
claim in a new action, where the defending party, the plaintiff in the prior suit,
generally would have a right of removal. 1A J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2,
0.167[10] n.24, at 512; see Central of Ga. Ry. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 426 F.2d
935, 938 (5th Cir. 1970).
In addition, many state impleader statutes are patterned after Rule 14 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are virtually identical in language, providing
that the defendant may implead a party who may be liable to him if he is liable to the
plaintiff. E.g., Ala. R. Civ. P. 14(a); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 14(a); Ark. R. Civ. P. 14(a);
Colo. R. Civ. P. 14(a); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-102(a) (West Supp. 1983); Del. Super.
Ct. Civ. R. 14(a); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.180(a); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-14(a) (1982);
Idaho R. Civ. P. 14(a); Ind. R. Trial P. 14(a); Kan. R. Civ. P. 60-214(a); Ky. R. Civ.
P. 14.01; Mass. R. Civ. P. 14(a); Minn. R. Civ. P. 14.01; Mont. R. Civ. P. 14(a);
Nev. R. Civ. P. 14(a); N.M.R. Civ. P. 14(a) (district courts); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law
§ 1007 (MeKinney 1976); N.D.R. Civ. P. 14(a); Ohio R. Civ. P. 14(a); S.D. Codified
Laws Ann. § 15-6-14(a) (Supp. 1983); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 14.01; Utah R. Civ. P. 14(a);
Vt. R. Civ. P. 14(a); W. Va. R. Civ. P. 14(a). As a result, the uniform application
rationale for removal is questionable, because the same claims generally could be
impleaded regardless which state impleader statute is employed.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976). When a "separate and independent" claim is
properly removed under section 1441(c), the entire case is initially brought into
federal court. Id. The provision thus provides a means for a federal court to hear
state claims that are unrelated to the "separate and independent" federal claim. This
raises the constitutional question whether Congress may provide removal jurisdiction
for state claims that are not within the federal courts' original statutory jurisdiction.
1A J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2, 0.163[3], at 315-22; C. Wright, supra note
2, § 39, at 223; 14 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 7, at 649-54;
Cohen, supra note 5, at 20-25, 34-41; Lewin, supra note 5, at 484-87; Moore &
VanDercreek, supra note 9, at 434-37. The majority of commentators, however,
have concluded that section 1441(c) is constitutional. See 1A J. Moore & B. Ringle,
supra note 2, 0.163[3], at 317-21; C. Wright, supra note 2, § 39, at 223; Cohen,
supra note 5, at 25, 41; Moore & VanDercreek, supra note 9, at 496-98. But see
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can Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn,60 the Supreme Court interpreted the
phrase "separate and independent" in section 1441(c). The Court
stated that "where there is a single wrong to plaintiff, for which relief
is sought, arising from an interlocked series of transactions, there is no
separate and independent claim or cause of action under § 1441(c). '"6
Applying the Finn test, courts either have found that the principal
and third-party claims involve a single wrong to the plaintiffU2 or
Lewin, supra note 5, at 435-37. In cases lacking complete diversity but that are
removed under section 1441(c) on the basis of a diverse "separate and independent"
claim, the statute can be constitutionally upheld as a grant of jurisdiction on the
grounds of partial diversity. 1A J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2, 0.163[3], at
321; C. Wright, supra note 2, § 39, at 223; Cohen, supra note 5, at 25; see State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (complete diver-
sity not constitutionally required). A more difficult constitutional issue is raised when
a case, removed under section 1441(c) on the basis of a claim involving a "separate
and independent" federal question, brings unrelated state claims into federal court.
See IA J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2, 0.163[3], at 320; 14 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 7, § 3724, at 649; Moore & VanDercreek, supra note
9, at 497. In Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), the Supreme Court stated that
pendent jurisdiction "does not go so far as to permit a federal court to assume
jurisdiction of a separate and distinct non-federal cause of action because it is joined
• ..with a federal cause of action." Id. at 245-46; see United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1966). If Hurn delineates the limits of federal jurisdic-
tion, section 1441(c) would be unconstitutional, because it does allow a federal court
to hear state claims that are unrelated to the "separate and independent" federal
claim. C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 7, § 3724, at 649-50; see
Cohen, supra note 5, at 34; Lewin, supra note 5, at 434-36. Nonetheless, commenta-
tors have contended that Hum does not establish the constitutional boundaries of
subject matter jurisdiction, Cohen, supra note 5, at 36-37; Moore & VanDercreek,
supra note 9, at 498; see 1A J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2, 0.163[3], at 320-21,
and have argued that section 1441(c) can be upheld on a theory of ancillary or
pendent jurisdiction. IA J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2, 0.163[3], at 231;
Cohen, supra note 5, at 41; Moore & VanDercreek, supra note 9, at 498. But see
Lewin, supra note 5, at 436. Moreover, the statute gives a federal court the discretion
to remand the unrelated state claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976), thereby permitting
the court to avoid any potential constitutional problems. See Cohen, supra note 5, at
40. Because the principal claim has been remanded to state court in virtually every
case of third-party removal, see supra note 20, the constitutional questions concern-
ing section 1441(c) have not yet been raised. The potential constitutional issues
concerning section 1441(c) are beyond the scope of this Note. For further discussion
of these issues, see Duvall, Removal-The "Separate and Independent Claim," 7
Okla. L. Rev. 385, 391 (1954); Wills & Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Removal
Jurisdiction and Procedure, 9 Ohio St. L.J. 257, 268 (1948); Note, Proposed Revision
of the "Separable Controversy" Rule in Federal Procedure, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 105, 110
(1947); Note, Courts-U.S. Code, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure-Removal of
Causes under the Revised Judicial Code., 33 Minn. L. Rev. 738, 742 n.19 (1949);
Note, The "Separable Controversy" Problem of Federal Jurisdiction: How Affected
by the New Judicial Code?, 10 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 385, 389 (1949); 40 Calif. L. Rev.
317, 320 n.18 (1952).
60. 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
61. Id. at 14.
62. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. v. Russian River County Sanitation Dist., 538 F.
Supp. 488, 494 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Luebbe v. Presbyterian Hosp., 526 F. Supp. 1162,
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have determined that the third-party claim derives from "an inter-
locked series of transactions. '6 3 When either of these criteria is met,
Finn requires the federal court to decline jurisdiction over the claim. 64
Courts permitting removal of third-party claims, however, hold
that a third-party claim does not necessarily involve a "single wrong to
plaintiff, for which relief is sought. '6 5 The third party in some cases
may have only wronged the defendant, and the plaintiff thus is tech-
nically not seeking relief from the third party. 6 In addition, the
principal and third-party claims do not necessarily derive from "an
interlocked series of transactions" as set forth in the Finn test.6 7 The
factual inquiries in each claim may be quite distinct, such as when the
principal claim sounds in tort and the third-party claim sounds in
contract, therefore making the claims sufficiently "separate and inde-
pendent."68
In order to determine whether third-party claims can meet this
statutory requirement, it is necessary to establish a precise meaning
for the phrase "separate and independent." An inquiry must be made
into the legislative history of section 1441(c) to arrive at a proper
interpretation of this phrase.
1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Marriage of Thompson, 450 F. Supp. 197, 199 (W.D.
Tex. 1978); see Chase v. North Am. Sys., 523 F. Supp. 378, 383 (W.D. Pa. 1981);
Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anchor Constr. Co., 326 F. Supp. 245, 249 (E.D. Pa.
1971); Coleman v. A & D Mach. Co., 298 F. Supp. 234, 237 (E.D. Cal. 1969).
63. See Holloway v. Gamble-Skogmo Inc., 274 F. Supp. 321, 322 (N.D. Ill.
1967); Schoneweather v. L. F. Richardson, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 692, 693 (W.D. Mo.
1954).
64. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951).
65. See Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 135-36(5th Cir. 1980); Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 494 F. Supp. 344, 349 (E.D. La.
1980), aff'd, 652 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Ted
Lokey Real Estate Co. v. Gentry, 336 F. Supp. 741, 743 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Way-
rynen Funeral Home, Inc. v. J. G. Link & Co., 279 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mont.
1968).
66. See supra note 65.
67. Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 494 F. Supp. 344, 349 (E.D. La. 1980), aff'd,
652 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Ted Lokey Real
Estate Co. v. Gentry, 336 F. Supp. 741, 743 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Wayrynen Funeral
Home, Inc. v. J.G. Link & Co., 279 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mont. 1968); see Carl
Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 136-37 (5th Cir. 1980);
Bond v. Doig, 433 F. Supp. 243, 247 (D.N.J. 1977).
68. Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 494 F. Supp. 344, 349-50 (E.D. La. 1980)(claim for insurance coverage separate from tort claim), aff'd, 652 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Bond v. Doig, 433 F. Supp. 243, 248-49
(D.N.J. 1977) (claim for indemnity separate from tort claim). For other examples of
third-party claims found to be "separate and independent" see Carl Heck Eng'rs v.
Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1980) (third-party claim
for indemnity separate from breach of contract); Peturis v. Fendley, 496 F. Supp.
203, 204-05 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (claim for conversion separate from claim for breach of
warranty); Myers v. Cain, 287 F. Supp. 352, 353 (D. Mont. 1968) (claim for breach
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2. Legislative History and Statutory Construction
Under the statutory predecessor to section 1441(c),69 two categories
of claims could be removed: (1) separable controversies, which were
thought to be integrally related to other claims in the suit yet capable
of being detached and adjudicated alone;70 and (2) separate contro-
versies, which were unrelated to other claims in the suit. 71 The distinc-
tions between separable and separate controversies, although theoreti-
of warranty separate from tort claim); Wayrynen Funeral Home, Inc. v. J. G. Link
& Co., 279 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mont. 1968) (claim for insurance coverage separate
from tort claims).
69. Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1094-95. The statute
provided, in pertinent part:
And when in any suit mentioned in this section there shall be a controversy
which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be fully
determined as between them, then either one or more of the defendants
actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the district
court of the United States for the proper district.
Id. at 1094. Unlike section 1441(c), this portion of the statute did not provide for
removal on the basis of a federal question. See id.
70. IA J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2, 0.162[3], at 304-08; Lewin, supra
note 5, at 428; see C. Wright, supra note 2, § 39, at 220; Duvall, Removal-The
"Separate and Independent Claim," 7 Okla. L. Rev. 385, 387 (1954); Comment,
Chaos of Jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts, 35 Ill. L. Rev. 566, 576 (1941)
[hereinafter cited as Chaos of Jurisdiction]. The phrase "separable controversy"
derives from The Separable Controversy Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 306, which introduced
the concept that if a "separable controversy between citizens of different states" was
present within a larger lawsuit, the separable portion of the action could be removed.
14 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 7, § 3724, at 621. The statute was
amended in 1875, Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (repealed 1911), and the
Supreme Court construed the new language to mean that the entire suit could be
removed if a separable controversy was present. Id.; Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S.
205, 212 (1880). The amended statute remained largely unchanged until the provi-
sion was superseded by section 1441(c). For examples of separable controversies, see
Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939); Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205
(1880); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1945). See
generally Holmes, The Separable Controversy-A Federal Removal Concept, 12
Miss. L.J. 163 (1939); Keefe & Lacey, The Separable Controversy-A Federal Con-
cept, 33 Cornell L.Q. 261 (1947).
71. IA J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2, 0.163[1], at 308-11; Cohen, supra
note 5, at 4; Duvall, supra note 67, at 387; Lewin, supra note 5, at 428 & n. 15; see
C. Wright, supra note 2, § 39, at 220. Courts developed the principle that if state law
permitted the joinder of distinct suits, one between parties of diverse citizenship and
one between citizens of the same state, only the controversy between the diverse
parties could be removed. Note, The Content of "Separable Controversy" for Pur-
poses of Removal to the Federal Courts., 36 Colum. L. Rev. 794, 799 n.35 (1936); see
Note, Removal under Section 1441(c) of the Judicial Code, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 101,
101-02 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Removal Under Section 1441(c)]; Note, Separa-
tion of Causes in Removal Proceedings, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1048, 1048-50 (1928)
[hereinafter cited as Separation of Causes]. The removable portion of such a case was
deemed a "separate," rather than "separable," controversy. lA J. Moore & B. Ringle,
supra note 2, 0.163[1], at 308-09; see C. Wright, supra note 2, § 39, at 220; see,
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cally sound, engendered much confusion in the courts,72 prompting
the enactment of section 1441(c) .3 By eliminating the separable con-
troversy as a ground for removal, Congress intended to simplify re-
moval as well as to limit it to those situations in which distinct claims
or causes of action had been joined.74 In changing the basis for re-
moval to claims which are "separate and independent," the revisers
apparently had the concept of the separate controversy in mind,
because they specifically indicated that a separate cause of action may
be removed under the section.75 Separable controversies, which are
integrally related to other claims in the suit, were expressly eliminated
from the provision.7 6 The legislative history, therefore, suggests that
Congress, by using the phrase "separate and independent," intended
to predicate removal under section 1441(c) upon a high degree of
disassociation between the claim to be removed and the other claims
in the suit.
77
e.g., Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1885); Tillman v. Russo Asiatic
Bank, 51 F.2d 1023, 1027-28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 539 (1931); Alabama
Power Co. v. Gregory Hill Gold Mining Co., 5 F.2d 705, 707 (E.D. Ala. 1925).
72. H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. A133-34 (1947), reprinted in
Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976); see 1A J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note
2, 0.162[1], at 299; Chaos of Jurisdiction, supra note 70, at 576; Separation of
Causes, supra note 70, at 1048-50.
73. H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A133-34 (1947), reprinted in
Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976); IA J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2,
0.162[1], at 299.
74. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 9-11 (1951); H.R.
Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A133-34 (1947), reprinted in Reviser's Note, 28
U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976); IA J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2, 0.162[1], at 299;
C. Wright, supra note 2, § 39, at 221; C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note
7, § 3724, at 622-23.
75. H.R, Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A134 (1947), reprinted in Reviser's
Note, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976); see 1A J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2,
0. 162[1], at 299; Cohen, supra note 5, at 6; Moore & VanDercreek, supra note 9, at
492.
76. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1951); H.R.
Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A134 (1947), reprinted in Reviser's Note, 28
U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976); Lewin, supra note 5, at 429. In this context, it is interesting
to note that the decisions under the former statute were also in conflict as to third-
party removal. Some courts held that third-party claims were separable and thus
removable, Summers & Oppenheim, Inc. v. Tillinghast Stiles Co., 19 F. Supp. 230,
230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. Chaffee-Shippers' Serv., 10 F.
Supp. 898, 898-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), while other courts determined that third-party
claims were non-separable and non-separate and therefore were not removable,
Henry v. Rice, 74 F. Supp. 222, 223 (E.D. Mo. 1947); Von Herwarth v. Gristede
Bros., 20 F. Supp. 911, 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
77. See H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A134 (1941), reprinted in
Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976). The Note states in pertinent part:
Subsection (c) permits the removal of a separate cause of action but not of a
separable controversy unless it constitutes a separate and independent claim
or cause of action within the original jurisdiction of United States District
1983]
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The Supreme Court's decision in Finn is in accord with this legisla-
tive history. After tracing the evolution of section 1441(c),78 the Court
emphasized that the phrase "separate and independent" means that
the claims must be substantially disconnected from the other claims in
the suit.79 The Court noted: "The addition of the word 'independent'
gives emphasis to congressional intention to require more complete
disassociation between the federally cognizable proceedings and those
cognizable only in state courts before allowing removal."80 By inter-
preting the statute in this manner, the Court was following a long line
of Supreme Court precedent in which the terms "separate" and "inde-
pendent" have been employed in a jurisdictional context to mean that
the claims are logically and factually unrelated. 81
This construction of section 1441(c) is consistent with decisions
denying removal by original defendants under the statute in the lower
federal courts.82 In addition, federal courts that have permitted de-
fendants to remove under section 1441(c) have done so on the ground
that the claims were sufficiently disassociated.8 3 Furthermore, this
Courts. In this respect it will somewhat decrease the volume of Federal
litigation.
Id. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 12 (1951); Cohen, supra
note 5, at 6-8; Lewin, supra note 5, at 432; Removal under Section 1441(c), supra
note 71, at 101-02. But see Keefe, Thaler, Bernstein, Wright & Gilmer, Venue and
Removal Jokers in the New Federal Judicial Code, 38 Va. L. Rev. 569, 603 (1952)
(contending that Congress intended no change in the basis for removal).
78. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 9-12 (1951).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
81. E.g., Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283, 286 (1942) (when joined claims arise
out of "wholly separate and distinct transactions or engagements," they are "unre-
lated"); Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245-48 (1933) (a "separate and distinct" and
"wholly independent" non-federal claim is outside federal pendent jurisdiction);
Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1885) (joined claim of a "separate
and distinct" character is essentially a complete and different suit).
82. See, e.g., Gray v. New Mexico Military Inst., 249 F.2d 28, 30 (10th Cir.
1957); Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 184 F.2d 537, 538-39 (3d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 903 (1951); City of New York v. New York Jets Football Club, Inc.,
429 F. Supp. 987, 990, 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Frontier Enters. v. ICA Corp., 319 F.
Supp. 1156, 1159-60 (D. Minn. 1970); First Nat'l Bank v. American Marine & Gen.
Ins. Co., 181 F. Supp. 285, 288-89 (E.D. Ark. 1960); Koeppe v. Lundell Mfg. Co.,
179 F. Supp. 918, 920 (D. Minn. 1959); Guess v. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co.,
143 F. Supp. 807, 809-10 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Knight v. Chrysler Corp., 134 F. Supp.
598, 600 (D.N.J. 1955).
83. See, e.g., U.S. Indus. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004, 1012-13 (D. Del. 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908
(1977); Knight v. First Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 256 F. Supp. 32, 34 (W.D. Okla.
1966); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913, 917-18
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Fine v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 361, 363-64 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Alabama Vermiculite Corp. v. Patterson, 149 F. Supp. 534, 540 (W.D.S.C.
1955); Allison v. American Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 37, 39 (N.D. Okla. 1953).
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construction of the statute conforms with the rationale of section
1441(c) that a party should not be able to defeat another party's right
of removal through the addition of unrelated non-removable claims . 4
Having established that the phrase "separate and independent" means
that only claims which are entirely unrelated may be removed under
section 1441(c), the next inquiry is whether a third-party claim can
ever be sufficiently disassociated to satisfy this statutory requirement.
II. IMPLEADER AND THE "SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT" REQUIREMENT
Requests for third-party removal to date generally have been been
based upon a situation in which the original defendant asserts a claim
against a third-party defendant through impleader.15 When a defend-
ant impleads a third party, he does so on the theory that if he is liable
to the plaintiff, the third-party defendant will be liable to him. 6 A
properly impleaded claim, therefore, must be contingent to some
extent upon the outcome of the principal action. 7 Because the liability
of the impleaded third party depends upon the way in which the
principal claim is resolved,"" the third-party defendant may protect
his interests by setting forth any defenses that the defendant could
have interposed. 9 In addition, the third-party action will generally be
84. See supra note 5. Section 1441(c) and its predecessors represent a response to
the practice of certain plaintiffs who joined in-state defendants with out-of-state
defendants in order to prevent- removal to federal court. See American Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 10 (1951); Southland Corp. v. Estridge, 456 F.
Supp. 1296, 1299 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
85. See, e.g., Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133,
134-35 (5th Cir. 1980); Morris v. Marshall County Bd. of Educ., 560 F. Supp. 43, 44
(N.D.W. Va. 1983); Share v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 F. Supp. 1107, 1107-08
(E.D. Pa. 1982); Bond v. Doig, 433 F. Supp. 243, 244 (D.N.J. 1977). See supra notes
9-15.
86. E.g., Wolski v. Hayes, 144 Ga. App. 180, 181, 240 S.E.2d 720, 721 (1977);
First New Haven Nat'l Bank v. Rosenberg, 33 Conn. Supp. 1, 2-3, 355 A.2d 319, 320
(1975); Horn v. Ketchum, 27 A.D.2d 759, 759, 277 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (1967)
(mem.).
87. See, e.g., Teulon v. Johnson, 36 Conn. Supp. 134, 135-36, 414 A.2d 818,
818-19 (1980) (defendant may not implead third party on the theory that the third
party is directly liable to the plaintiff); Ingerman v. Bonder, 46 Del. 99, 100, 77 A.2d
591, 592 (Super. Ct. 1950) (same); Boling v. Barnes, 198 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1967) (same); First Nat'l Bank v. Espinoza, 95 N.M. 20, 21, 618 P.2d 364,
365 (1980) (same).
88. Southeast Mortgage Co. v. Mullins, 514 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1975);
Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Just, 126 Ga. App. 643, 647, 191 S.E.2d 632, 634
(1972); see Horn v. Ketchum, 27 A.D.2d 759, 759, 277 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (1967)
(mem.).
89. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a); see C. Wright, supra note 2, § 76, at 513. Many state
impleader statutes also provide for this interposing of defenses by the third party.
E.g., Ariz. R. Civ. P. 14(a); Colo. R. Civ. P. 14(a); Idaho R. Civ. P. 14(a); Mont. R.
Civ. P. 14(a); Vt. R. Civ. P. 14(a); W. Va. R. Civ. P. 14(a); see, e.g., Modernage
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dismissed if the defendant is not held liable to the plaintiff. 0 For these
reasons, a third-party claim is largely dependent upon the principal
claim.
Impleader, however, is not a compulsory procedure; a defendant
may choose not to bring a third-party defendant into a suit, even
though such a procedural option is available. 9' For example, the
defendant may decide to assert his claim in an independent action.92 It
can be argued, therefore, that a third-party claim is "separate and
independent" from the principal claim, because the third-party claim
can be properly adjudicated in an entirely separate action. 93 At the
same time, however, the purpose of impleader is to enable related
claims to be disposed of in one suit.9 4 That is, it requires that the third-
party claims be dependent on the principal claims.95
Homes v. Wooldridge, 55 Ala. App. 68, 72, 313 So.2d 190, 193 (1975); Lewis v.
Borg-Warner Corp., 35 A.D.2d 722, 723, 314 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (1970) (mem.),
modified, 37 A.D.2d 609, 325 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1971) (mem.).
90. See, e.g., Duke v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 209 F.2d 204, 208-09 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 966 (1954); United States v. Houff, 202 F. Supp. 471,
480 (W.D. Va.), aff'd, 312 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1962); Maryland ex rel. Wood v.
Robinson, 74 F. Supp. 279, 282 (D. Md. 1947); C. Wright, supra note 2, § 76, at
515. Courts, however, have exercised their discretion to hear third-party claims after
the principal claim has been dismissed when dismissal of the third-party claim would
substantially prejudice the third-party plaintiff. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v.
Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843, 846 (3d Cir. 1962) (third-party claim
retained after extensive discovery); Southern Milling Co. v. United States, 270 F.2d
80, 84 (5th Cir. 1959) (third-party claim retained when statute of limitations would
bar claim if asserted in new action); Bowen v. Evanuk, 423 F. Supp. 1341, 1345
(D.R.I. 1976) (same).
91. Key Hotel Corp. v. Crowe, Chizek & Co., 172 Ind. App. 15, 18, 359 N.E.2d
262, 264 (1977); C. Wright, supra note 2, § 76, at 509; see Latex Filler & Chem. Co.
v. Chapman, 139 Ga. App. 382, 383-84, 228 S.E.2d 312, 314 (1976).
92. C. Wright, supra note 2, § 76, at 509; e.g., Union Paving Co. v. Thomas, 9
F.R.D. 612, 613 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Maloney Concrete Co. v. District of Columbia
Transit Sys., 241 Md. 420, 422-23, 216 A.2d 895, 896-97 (1966).
93. Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 136 (5th
Cir. 1980); Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 494 F. Supp. 344, 349-50 (E.D. La.
1980), affd, 652 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Bond
v. Doig, 433 F. Supp. 243, 247 (D.N.J. 1977).
94. See Thomas v. Malco Refineries, 214 F.2d 884, 886 (1954); Concordia Col-
lege Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 14 F.R.D. 403, 405 (D. Minn. 1953); Ashford v.
Burnham Aviation Serv., 162 Colo. 582, 585, 427 P.2d 875, 877 (1967); Pioneer Mut.
Compensation Co. v. Cosby, 125 Colo. 468, 472, 244 P.2d 1089, 1091-92 (1952);
Senior v. Hope, 156 Conn. 92, 96, 239 A.2d 486, 489 (1968).
95. See Southeast Mortgage Co. v. Mullins, 514 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Joe Grasso & Son, Inc., 380 F.2d 749, 751-52 (5th Cir. 1967); Smith,
Kline & French Labs. v. Just, 126 Ga. App. 643, 647, 191 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1972);
Horn v. Ketchum, 27 A.D.2d 759, 759, 277 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (1967) (mem.); State
ex rel. Jacobs v. Municipal Court, 30 Ohio St. 2d 239, 242, 284 N.E.2d 584, 586
(1972).
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Confirming this dependency between an impleaded claim and the
principal claim, the Supreme Court has stated that "[a] third-party
complaint depends at least in part upon the resolution of the primary
lawsuit. Its relation to the original complaint is thus not mere factual
similarity but logical dependence."9 It thus may be improper for a
third-party defendant to attempt to remove an impleaded claim under
section 1441(c), because a "separate and independent" claim is not a
claim that can properly be impleaded by the defendant.9 7 An im-
pleaded claim, therefore, by definition should not be characterized as
"separate and independent" for purposes of removal under section
1441(c).
Moreover, it can be argued that under this analysis impleaded
claims fail to meet the Supreme Court's criteria, established in Finn,
for "separate and independent" claims under section 1441(c). Because
the liability of a third party on an impleaded claim derives from the
liability of the defendant to the plaintiff, 98 the principal claim and the
third-party claim are both concerned with the "wrong to plaintiff, for
which relief is sought."9 9 The transactions giving rise to the third-
party claim thus are also "interlocked" with the plaintiffs claim. 0 0 An
impleaded third-party claim, therefore, should not be interpreted as
"separate and independent" according to the construction given those
terms by the Court in Finn.'1
96. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978) (citation
omitted); see Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925).
97. Jamison v. Schneider, 561 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (D. Kan. 1983); see United
States v. Joe Grasso & Son, Inc., 380 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1967) ("an entirely
separate and independent claim cannot be maintained against a third party [under
the impleader statute]"); Augenti v. Capellini, 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 382,
385 (M.D. Pa. 1980) ("[a] defendant cannot assert an entirely separate claim against
a third party under [the impleader statute]"); Arms Roofing Co. v. Petrie, 136 Colo.
154, 159-60, 314 P.2d 903, 906 (1957) (improper to implead "separate and indepen-
dent controversies between defendant and . . . third-party defendant"); Nesmith v.
Lynn, 377 A.2d 352, 353 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977) ("[a] separate and independent cause
of action cannot be maintained against a third party [under the impleader statute]");
Bill Heard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 120 Ga. App. 328,
330, 170 S.E.2d 454, 456 (1969) (impermissible to implead separate and independent
claim); Cleveland v. Farber, 46 A.D.2d 733, 733, 361 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (1974)
(mem.) (impleaded claim dismissed where claim was "separate, distinct and not
related" to the main claim).
98. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
99. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951); see supra note
62.
100. 341 U.S. at 14 (1951); see supra note 63.
101. Under federal law, impleaded third-party claims are within the ancillaryjurisdiction of a federal court, even though such claims lack an independent basis of
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S.
365, 375 & n.18 (1978); C. Wright, supra note 2, § 76, at 515; e.g., H. L. Peterson
Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1967); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804,
807 (2d Cir. 1958). Similarly, pendent jurisdiction permits a federal court to hear a
19831
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III. POLICY CONCERNS IN ANALYZING THIRD-PARTY REMOVAL
An analysis of the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the
third-party defendant further weighs against third-party removal of
impleaded claims and therefore is consistent with the statutory pur-
pose of section 1441(c). Removal is a statutory right that gives a
defendant the authority to choose a federal forum when Article III
jurisdiction otherwise exists.' 02 A third-party defendant, at times, has
an interest in removing the impleaded claim to federal court.10 3 For
claim even though it has no independent basis of federal jurisdiction over the claim.
C. Wright, supra note 2, § 19, at 103-05; e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1933); see Owen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370-71 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard,
427 U.S. 1, 9 (1976). Thus, pendent jurisdiction is thought to be closely related to
ancillary jurisdiction. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370
(1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 9-13 (1976). An analogy to pendent jurisdic-
tion is, therefore, appropriate to an analysis of impleaded claims. The Supreme
Court in Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), held that a non-federal claim that can
be characterized as "wholly independent," id. at 248, and "separate and distinct,"
id. at 246, from a federal claim is not within federal pendent jurisdiction. Id. at 246,
248. If the related doctrine of pendent jurisdiction may not extend to such separate
and independent non-federal claims, then, by analogy, ancillary jurisdiction, which
includes impleader, should not include such claims. See Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375 & n.18 (1978). In Owen Equipment, the plaintiff
amended his complaint to assert a claim against the third-party defendant, who was
impleaded by the defendant. Id. at 367. The defendant's motion for summary
judgment was granted, leaving only the plaintiff and the third party in the case in
federal court. Id. at 368. It was later revealed at trial that the third party and the
plaintiff were citizens of the same state. Id. at 369. Because the parties failed to meet
the complete diversity requirement, the Court stated that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the claim. Id. at 377. Characterizing the claim as "entirely
separate" and "independent" from the principal claim, id. at 376, the Court held
that it was outside federal ancillary jurisdiction. Id. at 376-77. This analogy is
consistent with the requirement that a defendant must have an independent basis of
federal jurisdiction for any additional claims asserted against the third party not
arising from impleader. Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d
1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Payne v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 472
F.2d 792, 795-96 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973); C. Wright, supra note
2, § 76, at 511. In light of this analysis, it would be an improper expansion of federal
jurisdiction to find that an impleaded third-party claim is "separate and indepen-
dent" under section 1441(c).
102. C. Wright, supra note 2, § 38, at 209.
103. There are a number of potential reasons why a party would want to have a
case heard in federal rather than state court, including: freedom from local preju-
dice, see Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing); Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 37, 50, 5 Cranch 61, 87 (1809);
the broad federal discovery procedures, IA J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra note 2,
0.157[13], at 198; the possibility of transferring the case to a more convenient venue
in a sister state, id. at 197; the federal unanimous jury verdict requirement, id. at
196; the greater discretion afforded to federal judges, id. at 198 n.18; the larger area
from which jurors are drawn, id.; and the overall quality of the administration of
justice, 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 7, § 3601, at 592-93 & n.66.
THIRD-PARTY REMOVAL
example, the third-party defendant may believe that the quality of
justice is superior in federal court, 10 4 where the judges have tenure for
life. 05 The third party may also wish to remove in order to avail
himself of the federal pre-trial procedures, which are considered bet-
ter than those found in certain state court systems. 10 Moreover, the
third-party defendant's removal interest is particularly acute when
the plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the forum state, while the
third party is a citizen of another state. 0 7 In such cases, the third-
party defendant may fear state court prejudice against him, which is a
long-standing rationale for removal.108
Recognizing that a third party may be subject to local state bias, 0 9
the American Law Institute (ALI) has adopted a proposal whereby a
third-party defendant would have a general right of removal in diver-
104. 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 7, § 3601, at 592 & n.66;
see 1 J. Moore, J. Lucas, H. Fink, D. Weckstein & J. Wicker, supra note 2,
0.71[3.-1], at 701.26-.27, 0.71[3.-2], at 701.30, 701.32.
105. C. Wright, supra note 2, § 23, at 134; 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
supra note 7, § 3601, at 593.
106. See 1 J. Moore, J. Lucas, H. Fink, D. Weckstein & J. Wicker, supra note 2,
0.71[3.-2], at 701.32.
107. These facts often arise in cases of third-party removal. See, e.g., Carl Heck
Eng'rs, Inc. v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1980); Luebbe v.
Presbyterian Hosp., 526 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Marsh Inv. Corp. v.
Langford, 494 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. La. 1980), aff'd, 652 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Lowe's of Montgomery, Inc. v. Smith, 432 F.
Supp. 1008 (M.D. Ala. 1977); Wayrynen Funeral Home, Inc. v. J.G. Link & Co.,
279 F. Supp. 803 (D. Mont. 1968). In such cases, there is a risk that the local state
court would be prejudiced against the non-resident third-party defendant. See Gam-
ble v. Central of Ga. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 328 (M.D. Ala.), rev'd on other
grounds, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973).
108. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883); Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. 37, 50, 5 Cranch 61, 87 (1809); 1 J. Moore, J. Lucas, H. Fink, D.
Weekstein & J. Wicker, supra note 2, 0.71[3.-1], at 701.20; C. Wright, supra note
2, § 23, at 128; 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 7, § 3601, at 589.
The local prejudice rationale for removal, however, is currently regarded as a
doctrine of diminishing validity due to societal mobility. C. Wright, supra note 2,
§ 23, at 133; C. Wright, E. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 7, § 3601, at 590-91. A
recent survey indicates that local prejudice is not a major factor in choosing a federal
forum. See Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of Forum in Diver-
sity Cases, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 933, 937-40 (1962) (local prejudice a factor in only 4.3%
of cases brought in federal court). But see Note, The Choice between State and
Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51 Va. L. Rev. 178, 179 (1965) (60.3%
of plaintiffs' attorneys polled indicated local prejudice a factor in choosing a federal
forum). Moreover, a judge has discretion to reduce the risk of such potential preju-
dice by ordering separate trials for the principal and third-party claims. C. Wright,
supra note 2, § 76, at 509; see, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b); Ala. R. Civ. P. 42(b);
Colo. R. Civ. P. 42(b); Mass. R. Civ. P. 42(b); Utah R. Civ. P. 42(b).
109. See American Law Institute, supra note 18, at 144, 146.
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sity cases." 0 The ALI, however, was concerned that the original
defendant would misuse this right of removal by impleading a third
party as a means of getting his case to federal court."' Accordingly,
the ALI limited the right of third-party removal by expressly prohibit-
ing such removal if the defendant and the third party are both insured
by the same liability insurer, or if they have a relationship of insurer-
insured or of employer-employee: those situations in which the third-
party defendant could be under the control of the original defend-
ant. 2 Although the potential for collusion to gain access to a federal
court is one reason to limit third-party removal, there are other inter-
ests of the defendant and the plaintiff which must be considered in
formulating a policy with respect to removal of third-party claims.
The defendant generally will have an interest in keeping the im-
pleaded third-party claim in state court."13 When third-party removal
is permitted, the federal court will hear the impleaded claim but will
routinely remand the principal claim to state court."14 When such
remand occurs, if the defendant does not wish to dismiss the claim, he
must defend the principal claim in state court while also bringing the
third-party claim in federal court." 5 Because the defendant has an
interest in resolving all of his related disputes in a single proceeding,
such a splitting of the suit may be procedurally uneconomical for
him." 6 The defendant's interests, therefore, weigh against permitting
third-party removal of impleaded claims.
110. Id. § 1304(b), at 16-17, 146. The American Law Institute, however, would
not permit third-party removal on the basis of a federal question. Id. at 197; see id.
§ 1312(a).
I11. Id. at 146-47. For example, if the plaintiff and the defendant were citizens of
the same state, the defendant could implead a diverse third party for the principal
purpose of having the entire case removed to federal court by the third-party defend-
ant.
112. Id.; see id. § 1304(b), at 16-17.
113. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
115. See Carl Heck Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 134 (5th
Cir. 1980); Peturis v. Fendley, 496 F. Supp. 203, 205 (S.D. Ala. 1980); Wayrynen
Funeral Home, Inc. v. J. G. Link & Co., 279 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mont. 1968);
McMahon v. City of Troy, 122 F. Supp. 555, 557 (N.D.N.Y. 1954); Industrial
Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954).
116. The primary purpose of impleader is to eliminate the "circuity of actions" in
making the defendant participate in two suits which could be economically resolved
in one proceeding. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 556 (1951);
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Perkins, 388 F.2d 771,
773 (10th Cir. 1968); United Bank of Denver Nat'l Ass'n v. Shavlik, 189 Colo. 280,
282, 541 P.2d 317, 318 (1975); C. Wright, supra note 2, § 76, at 509; 6 C. Wright &
E. Miller, supra note 7, § 1442, at 202-03.
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The plaintiff has an interest in recovering a complete judgment
without inordinate delay."17 This interest may be prejudiced by third-
party removal. When a third-party claim is removed under section
1441(c), the entire action is brought into federal court." 8 In virtually
every case of third-party removal, however, the principal claim is
subsequently remanded." 9 As a result, the plaintiff is subjected to a
procedural delay while his claim is removed to federal court and later
remanded. The third party may also use this delay as a strategic
weapon to encourage a settlement between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant, particularly when the plaintiff is under financial pressure to
recover on the claim.120
Removal by the third party under section 1441(c) may also impair
the plaintiffs recovery of the entire judgment. For example, if the
main claim is remanded to state court after the third-party action is
removed and the original defendant lacks sufficient financial resources
to compensate the plaintiff for his complete judgment, the plaintiff
would be uncertain as to his recovery despite having won the case on
the merits. The plaintiffs recovery of his judgment would depend
upon the later resolution of the dispute between the defendant and the
third-party defendant, which would have to be resolved at some
future date in federal court. Although the plaintiff might ultimately
obtain his entire judgment, he would be subjected to a lengthy period
of uncertainty.
Accordingly, removal of impleaded claims by third-party defend-
ants may substantially prejudice the plaintiffs interests. Although the
third party has an interest in having his claim adjudicated in federal
court, 121 this interest is outweighed by the effect such removal might
117. Another purpose of impleader is to avoid the "potentially damaging time
delay" between judgments in the main and third-party actions. 6 C. Wright & A.
Miller, supra note 7, § 1442, at 203; see Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 806-07 (2d Cir.
1959); Joe Grasso & Son, Inc. v. United States, 42 F.R.D. 329, 331 (S.D. Tex. 1966),
aff'd, 380 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1967).
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976).
119. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
120. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 997-1001
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (procedural delay forces settlements upon those unable
to bear the burden of delay); Note, Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions under the
Federal Rules, 59 Yale L.J. 117, 131 (1949) (procedural delay encourages settlement
when a party is anxious to go to trial). The defendant and the third-party defendant,
therefore, would have an incentive to collude in order to bring the case into federal
court. See Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 494 F. Supp. 344, 350 n.6 (E.D. La. 1980)
(potential for collusion between defendant and third-party defendant), aff'd, 652
F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); American Law Insti-
tute, supra note 18, at 146-47.
121. See supra notes 102-09.
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have on the interests of the plaintiff and the original defendant. 22
Public policy considerations, therefore, militate against removal of
impleaded third-party claims.
IV. ADDITIONAL CLAIMS AGAINST THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS-
A VIABLE JUSTIFICATION FOR REMOVAL
Under various state procedures patterned after the Federal Rules, it
is possible for a defendant, after he has properly impleaded a third-
party defendant, to assert any additional claims he has against such
third-party defendant. 123 Such additional claims could provide a
proper basis for removal under section 1441(c). A number of courts
have impliedly approved the removal of additional claims asserted
against a third-party defendant. 12 4 These courts, although denying
removal of the particular third-party claim before them, have indi-
cated that they would permit third-party removal under section
1441(c) if a truly "separate and independent" claim was presented. 125
When a defendant asserts an additional claim against a third-party
defendant, unlike the situation in impleader, he does not allege that
the third-party defendant would be liable to him if he is found liable
to the plaintiff. 126 Rather, the defendant simply takes advantage of the
procedural economy of resolving another claim against the third-party
122. See supra notes 113-20.
123. E.g., Ala. R. Civ. P. 18(a); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 18(a); Ark. R. Civ. P. 18(a);
Colo. R. Civ. P. 18(a); Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 18(a); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-18(a)
(1982); Idaho R. Civ. P. 18(a); Ind. R. Trial P. 18(a); Kan. R. Civ. P. 60-218(a); Ky.
R. Civ. P. 18.01; Mass. R. Civ. P. 18(a); Minn. R. Civ. P. 18.01; Mont. R. Civ. P.
18(a); Nev. R. Civ. P. 18(a); N.M.R. Civ. P. 18(a); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1009
(McKinney 1976); N.D.R. Civ. P. 18(a); Ohio R. Civ. P. 18(a); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 15-6-18(a) (Supp. 1983); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 18.01; Utah R. Civ. P. 18(a); Vt.
R. Civ. P. 18(a); W. Va. R. Civ. P. 18(a); see Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Sys.,
300 A.2d 231, 240 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); Navajo Freight Lines v. Baldonado, 90
N.M. 264, 266-67, 562 P.2d 497, 499-500 (1977).
124. See Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. v. Russian River County Sanitation Dist.,
538 F. Supp. 488, 493 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Coleman v. A & D Mach. Co., 298 F. Supp.
234, 236-37 (E.D. Cal. 1969).
125. See supra note 124.
126. The defendant alleges that the third-party defendant is liable to him regard-
less of the outcome of the defendant's dispute with the plaintiff. See, e.g., Falcon
Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Sys., 300 A.2d 231, 240 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); Navajo
Freight Lines v. Baldonado, 90 N.M. 264, 264-67, 562 P.2d 497, 499-500 (1977); Ala.
R. Civ. P. 18(a); Colo. R. Civ. P. 18(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 18(a).
This analysis can also be applied to additional claims which could theoretically be
brought by a plaintiff against a third-party defendant. For example, pursuant to a
statute equivalent to Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a) a plaintiff could assert a claim against a
third-party defendant arising from the transaction that is the subject of the principal
action. See, e.g., Colo. R. Civ. P. 14(a); Mass. R. Civ. P. 14(a); Ohio R. Civ. P.
14(a). Having asserted such a claim against the third-party defendant, the plaintiff
could assert additional claims against the third party pursuant to a state counterpart
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defendant in the same action as the impleaded claim, in order to
resolve all his disputes with the third-party defendant in one action.12 7
The additional claim, therefore, can properly be adjudicated alone
because the liability of the third-party defendant does not derive from
the resolution of the principal claim against the defendant. 2 8 Such an
additional claim is "separate and independent" from the principal
claim because it is not dependent upon the resolution of that action. 129
In addition, the Finn interpretation of "separate and independent" is
satisfied because the additional claim is not connected with the "single
wrong to plaintiff," and does not arise from the "interlocked series of
transactions" giving rise to the plaintiffs claim. 130 Removal of such a
claim under section 1441(c), therefore, would be proper under Finn.
Removal of an additional claim asserted against a third-party de-
fendant is also consistent with principles of ancillary jurisdiction.
Impleaded claims are cognizable in federal court under ancillary
jurisdiction and thus are not "separate and independent" as required
by section 1441(c).131 On the other hand, an additional claim against a
third-party defendant requires an independent basis of federal juris-
diction because ancillary jurisdiction does not extend to such a
claim.1 32 Such an additional claim therefore can properly be charac-
terized as "separate and independent" from the principal claim and
should be removable by the third-party defendant.
In addition, considerations of public policy militate in favor of such
third-party removal of additional claims. Assuming that a federal
court hears only the additional claim and remands the remainder of
the suit to state court, the plaintiff's interests will not be substantially
prejudiced, because the third-party defendant will remain a party to
the state court action. 133 Moreover, the actions are unrelated and thus
properly adjudicable as separate actions. 134 The interests of the third-
party defendant in having his claim removed will be fulfilled. It is
proper for the third-party defendant to be allowed to remove such an
additional claim, because section 1441(c) is designed to prevent the
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). See, e.g., Colo. R. Civ. P. 18(a); Mass. R. Civ. P. 18(a);
Ohio R. Civ. P. 18(a); 3A J. Moore & J. Lucas, supra note 2, 18.04[4], at 18-25 n.4.
127. See C. Wright, supra note 2, § 76, at 511.
128. Such an additional claim is merely joined with the impleaded claim against
the third party. See, e.g., Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Sys., 300 A.2d 231, 240
(Del. Super. Ct. 1972); Navajo Freight Lines v. Baldonado, 90 N.M. 264, 266-67,
562 P.2d 497, 499-500 (1977).
129. See, e.g., Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Sys., 300 A.2d 231, 240 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1972); Navajo Freight Lines v. Baldonado, 90 N.M. 264, 266-67, 562 P.2d 497,
499-500 (1977).
130. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 101.
132. See supra note 101.
133. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 126-30.
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destruction of a right of removal by the joinder of a claim with other
unrelated non-removable claims. 135 Thus, the third party will be able
to gain the protection of the removal statutes, without prejudicing the
plaintiff's interests.136 Although the defendant must pursue actions in
two different fora, his interests are outweighed by the removal inter-
ests of the third-party defendant.
CONCLUSION
Claims asserted by a defendant against a third party through im-
pleader are not "separate and independent" from the principal claim
and, therefore, should not provide a basis for removal of such claims
to federal court under section 1441(c). Furthermore, public policy
considerations militate against removal of such claims. Additional
claims brought by a defendant against a third-party defendant, how-
ever, appear to satisfy the statutory requirement of being "separate
and independent" and removal of such claims is consistent with policy
interests regarding the parties. A third-party defendant, therefore,
should have a right of removal under section 1441(c) with respect to
such additional claims.
Haden P. Gerrish
135. See supra note 5.
136. The third-party defendant will remain a party to the state court action,
thereby protecting the plaintiff's interests. See supra notes 117-20.
